Susanna Siegel is Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University.

Introduction: Seeing John Malkovich
The Content View
Why does it matter whether the Rich Content View is true?
How can we decide whether the Rich Content View is true?
Part I: Contents

Chapter 1: Experiences
1.1 States of seeing and phenomenal states
1.2 Visual perceptual experiences
Chapter 2: The Content View
2.1 Contents as accuracy conditions
2.2 The Argument from Accuracy
2.3 A flaw in the Argument from Accuracy
2.4 The Argument from Appearing
2.5 Two objections from 'looks', 'appears' and their cognates
2.6 The significance of the Content View
Chapter 3: How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?
3.1 Introspection
3.2 Naturalistic theories of content
3.3 The method of phenomenal contrast
Part II: Properties
Chapter 4: Kinds
4.1 The examples
4.2 The premises
4.3 Content externalism
Chapter 5: Causation
5.1 The Causal Thesis
5.2 Michotte's results
5.3 Unity in experience
5.4 Non-causal contents
5.5 Raw feels
5.6 Non-sensory experiences
Part III: Objects
Chapter 6: The Role of Objects in the Contents of Experience
6.1 Strong and Weak Veridicality
6.2 The contents of states of seeing
6.3 The contents of phenomenal states
6.4 Phenomenal states: Internalism vs. Pure Disjunctivism
6.5 Why Internalism?
Chapter 7: Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience
7.1 Subject-independence and Perspectival Connectedness
7.2 The Good and the Odd
7.3 Complex contents
7.4 Objections and replies
Chapter 8: The Strong Content View revisited