Preface; Foreword Alvin E. Roth; Part I. Foundations of Market Design: 1. Two-sided markets: stable matching Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani; 2. One-sided matching markets Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani; 3. Matching markets with transfers and salaries Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani; 4. Objectives Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani; 5. Applications of online matching Zhiyi Huang and Thorben Trobst; 6. Online matching in advertisement auctions Nikhil R. Devanur and Aranyak Mehta; 7. Spectrum auctions from the perspective of matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt; 8. School choice Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Aram Grigoryam; 9. Kidney exchange Itai Ashlagi; 10. Normative properties for object allocation problems: characterizations and trade-offs Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus; 11. Choice and market design Samson Alva and Battal Dogan; 12. Combinatorics of stable matchings Tamas Fleiner; 13. Algorithmics of matching markets Jiehua Chen and David Manlove; 14. Generalized matching: contracts and networks John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp; 15. Complementarities and externalities Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra; 16. Large matching markets Jacob D. Leshno; 17. Pseudomarkets Marek Pycia; 18. Dynamic matching Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv; 19. Matching with search frictions Hector Chade and Philipp Kircher; 20. Unraveling Hanna Halaburda and Guillaume Haeringer; 21. Investment in matching markets Matthew Elliott and Eduard Talamas; 22. Signaling in two-sided matching markets Soohyung Lee; 23. Two-sided markets matching design Renato Gomez and Alessandro Pavan; 24. Matching market experiments Yan Chen; 25. Empirical models of non-transferable utility matching Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini; 26. Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie; 27. New solution concepts Shengwu Li and Irene Lo; 28. Machine learning for matching markets Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath; 29. Contract theory Gabriel Carroll; 30. Secretaries, prophets, and applications to matching Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier; 31. Exploration and persuasion Aleksandrs Slivkins; 32. Fairness in prediction and allocation Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron L. Roth.