Michael Klenk works at the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. His published papers on these topics in Synthese, Ratio, the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, among others. He works at Delft University of Technology and held visiting positions at St. Gallen and Stanford University.

Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology

Michael Klenk

Part I: Higher-Order Evidence against Morality

1. Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the Evidence

Silvan Wittwer

2. Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking

Norbert Paulo

3. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology

Paul Silva

4. Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence

Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman

Part II: Rebutting Higher-Order Evidence against Morality

5. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology

Brian C. Barnett

6. Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence

Marco Tiozzo

7. Debunking Scepticism

Michael Huemer

Part III: Broader Implications of Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology

8. Moral Testimony as Higher-Order Evidence

Marcus Lee, Neil Sinclair, & Jon Robson

9. Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral Epistemology

J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini

10. The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism

Joshua DiPaolo

Part IV: Permissible Epistemic Attitudes in Response to Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology

11. How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement

Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson

12. Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology

Justin Clarke-Doane