Pierre
von Mouche (1959) studied theoretical physics, mathematics and astronomy
at the University of Nijmegen. He received his PhD in mathematics from the
University of Utrecht under the supervision of Hans Duistermaat. Since
1989 he holds a position in economics at Wageningen University. His
scientific interest include mathematical economics and in particular the
equilibrium structure of games in strategic form.

Federico Quartieri (1979) studied economics at the University of
Florence. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Siena.
Since 2014 he holds a position in mathematical economics at the University
Federico II of Naples. His scientific interest include mathematical economics
and game theory.

Presents a state-of-the-art collection of studies on oligopoly theory

Covers topics including equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare

Presents an overview of the work of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory

Includes supplementary material: [...]

Introduction.- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi.- Cournot, a
Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone
Best Responses.- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative
Games: an Expository Treatment.- On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot
Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs.- Pure
Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to
Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games.- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly.-
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model.-
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy.- Cournot
Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets.- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly.-
Evolutionary
Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities.- Existence,
Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests.- Two-Group Contests with
Communication Within and Between Groups.- On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric
Public-Good Contests.- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking,
Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.