BRIAN P. MCLAUGHLIN is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in fields including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He co-authored (with Vann McGee) Terrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth (forthcoming, Oxford).

JONATHAN COHEN is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.

Notes on Contributors ix

Introduction to the Second Edition Jonathan Cohen xiii

Introduction to the First Edition Jonathan Cohen xviii

Part I Mental Content 1

Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3

1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5

2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 19

Is Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 33

3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 35

4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 50

Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 63

5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 65

6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 80

Is There Non-conceptual Content? 97

7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 99

8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard Kimberly Heck 110

Part II Physicalism 131

Is Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 133

9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism Louise Antony 135

10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 152

Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 173

11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 175

12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 189

Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 213

13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 215

14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 230

Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251

Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 253

15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 255

16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 272

Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 285

17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 287

18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 303

Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 317

19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 319

20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 341

Part IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359

Should Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 361

21 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science Craig French and Ian Phillips 363

22 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science Adam Pautz 384

23 Capacities-First Philosophy Susanna Schellenberg 406

Is Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 431

24 Perceiving Particulars Christopher S. Hill 433

25 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories Heather Logue 449

How Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 467

26 The Perception-Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? E. J. Green 469

27 Let's Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File Ned Block 494

Is Pain a Natural Kind? 517

28 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain Jennifer Corns 519

29 Pain Is a Natural Kind Matthew Fulkerson 535

Do We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 551

30 Against Imagination Bence Nanay 553

31 Why We Need Imagination Amy Kind 570

Index 588