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Über den Autor
Arthur O'Sullivan is Dr. Robert B. Pamplin Jr. Professor of Economics at Lewis & Clark College. He is the author of Urban Economics, Ninth Edition (2019), the best-selling urban economics text, and co-author, with Steven Sheffrin and Stephen Perez, of Economics: Principles, Applications, and Tools, Tenth Edition (2020).
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Part 1: Introduction
- Chapter 1. Introduction and Key Concepts of Microeconomics
- 1. What is Behavioral Economics?
- 2. Key Concepts of Microeconomics
- Opportunity Cost
- The Marginal Principle
- The Equimarginal Principle
- Nash Equilibrium
- Comparative Statics
- Pareto Efficiency
- Lotteries and Certainty Equivalent
- Chapter 2. Insights from Behavioral Science
- 1. Social Preferences and Norms
- Adam Smith and the Impartial Spectator
- Rule Following Task: Avatar Pedestrian
- Sharing the Rewards of Collaboration
- Incurring a Cost to Enforce a Social Norm
- The 50-50 Norm
- 2. Mental Shortcuts
- Mental Accounting
- Default Options
- 3. Cognitive Bias
- The Decoy Effect
- Present Bias
- 4. Problems with Probabilities
- Rare Events
- Gambler's Fallacy
- 5. Instincts and Deliberation
- Apple versus Cupcake
- Hunting Practices of the Ju/'hoansi
- Why Do We Do That?
- Appendix to Chapter 2
- 1. Anchors
- 2. Confirmation Bias
- 3. Overconfidence Effect
- 4. Availability Heuristic
- Part 2: Social Preferences
- Chapter 3. Social Norms: Sharing and Enforcement
- 1. Utility Maximization with a Social Norm
- 2. Sharing Behavior: The Dictator Game
- Game Structure and Results
- Variation in Sharing Behavior
- 3. Norm Enforcement: Ultimatum Game
- Game Structure
- Norm-Sensitive Responder
- Equilibrium Responder Share
- Norm-Sensitive Proposer
- 4. Results from Ultimatum-Game Experiments
- Meta Analysis of Ultimatum Experiments
- Crosswalk Rules and the Ultimatum Game
- Competition Between Responders
- Widget 3.1: Equilibrium in the Ultimatum Game
- Chapter 4. Trust
- 1. The Trust Game: Investment and Production
- Game Structure
- Outcome in the Absence of a Sharing Norm
- 2. Sharing Norm for the Producer
- Producer's Tradeoff
- Varying Norm Sensitivity and Return Fractions
- Investor Decision
- 3. Sharing Norm for the Investor
- Investor's Tradeoff
- Relative Norm Sensitivity and Equilibrium
- Social Norms, Efficiency, and Social Capital
- 4. Experiments and Implications
- Experimental Results
- Trust Game and Social Capital
- Trust Game and Oxytocin
- Chapter 5. Public Goods
- 1. Free Riding and Experiments
- The Free-Rider Problem
- Results from Voluntary-Contribution Experiments
- 2. Social Norms and Voluntary Contributions
- Norm: Efficient Choice
- Norm: Equal Contribution
- Explaining a Path of Decreasing Contributions
- 3. Punish Free Riders?
- Punishing Norm Violators
- Summary of Experimental Results
- Chapter 6. Reciprocity in the Workplace
- 1. Worker Reciprocity and Social Capital
- Perfect or Imperfect Information in the Workplace?
- Social Norms and Pareto Improvements
- 2. Worker Identity and Effort
- Utility-Maximizing Effort
- Insiders versus Outsiders
- Norm Sensitivity and Effort
- Producer Investment in Identity Management
- 3. Response to a Higher Wage
- Wages and a Sharing Norm
- Wages and the Work-Effort Norm
- Wages and Profit
- 4. Evidence of Worker Reciprocity
- Field Experiments
- A Gift-Exchange Experiment
- Chapter 7. Voluntary Prices
- 1. Voluntary Prices: Pay What You Want
- The Equal-Sharing Price and Norm-Violation Cost
- Variation in Norm Sensitivity
- Sustainability of PWW Systems
- Economic Experiment: Pay What You Want versus Pay it Forward
- Widget 7.1 PWW Price and Social Norms
- 2. Public Broadcasting: Free Riders and Punishing Pledge Drives
- Payoffs to Members and Free Riders
- Choosing the Length of a Pledge Drive
- Chapter 8. Imitation and Cultural Learning
- 1. Imitation and Conformity
- Over-Imitation by Humans
- Over-Imitation: Humans versus Chimpanzees
- Conformity and Matching Pennies
- 2. Faithful Imitation and Cultural Learning
- Manioc and Obscure Production Processes
- Social Learning: Humans versus Chimpanzees
- Part 3: Time Preferences
- Chapter 9. Discounting and Present Bias
- 1. Conventional Discounting and Present Bias
- The Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount Function
- Widget 9.1 Conventional Discounting and Present Bias
- Present Bias and Doubling Your Apples
- Time Inconsistency
- Time Inconsistency and the Relative Values of Bundles
- Present Bias and Regret
- 2. Estimates of Discounting Parameters
- Estimates of Conventional Discounting and Present Bias
- Economic Experiment: Patience Among Mothers and Children
- Widget 9.2 Roll Your Own Current Value
- 3. Illustrations: Cupcake, Weed, Bucket List
- Cupcake versus Apple
- Homeowner versus Weed
- The Bucket List
- Chapter 10. Time Preferences and Saving
- 1. Discounting and Intertemporal Choice
- Saving and the Equimarginal Principle
- Widget 10.1 Discounting, Present Bias, and Saving
- Present Bias and Regret
- 2. Saving Mandates and Nudges
- Response to Mandate: Active Saver
- Response to Mandate: Non-Saver
- Nudges: Defaults, Save More Tomorrow, and Saving Lotteries
- 3. Clueless versus Savvy Consumers
- Three-Period Model of Intertemporal Choice
- Consumption Path of the Clueless (Naive)
- Widget 10.2: Three-Period Consumption Program
- Regret of the Clueless
- Consumption Path of a Savvy Consumer
- Commitment Devices and Saving
- 4. Present Bias and Pre-Commitment by Pigeons
- Chapter 11. When to Act
- 1. Procrastination: Waiting Too Long
- Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker
- Conditions for Procrastination
- Widget 11.1 Present Bias and Procrastination
- Self Awareness and Procrastination
- Clueless versus Self-Aware: How to Tell the Difference
- 2. Preproperation: Acting Too Soon
- Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker
- Conditions for Preproperation
- Self Awareness and Preproperation
- Chapter 12. Application of Present Bias--Sin Taxes and Fertilizer
- 1. Personally Harmful Products and Sin Taxes
- A Model of a Personally Harmful Good
- Present Bias and a Personally Harmful Good
- Price and Consumer Choice
- Savvy Consumers and Hobbling
- Support for Sin Taxes
- Widget 12.1 Present Bias and a Sin Tax
- 2. Present Bias and Fertilizer Investment
- Review of Intertemporal Choice Model
- Present Bias and the Fertilizer Investment
- Policy Options
- Part 4: Mental Accounting and the Endowment Effect
- Chapter 13. Mental Accounting for Consumers
- 1. Mental Accounting and Fungibility
- Consumer Budgets and Fungibility
- Mental Accounting and Coupons
- 2. Other Implications of Mental Accounting
- Mental Accounting and Sunk Cost
- Decoupling Cost and Benefit: Credit Cards and Ride-Hailing Services
- Regular versus Premium Gasoline
- Chapter 14. Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect
- 1. Painful Loss and Loss Aversion
- Conventional Benefits and Costs of Exchange
- The Pain of Loss Exceeds the Joy of Gain
- Loss Aversion Parameter
- Loss Aversion and Reappraisal
- 2. The Endowment Effect
- Classic Endowment Experiment
- Evidence for the Endowment Effect
- Endowment Effect for Chimpanzees and Capuchin Monkeys
- The Endowment Effect and Asset Exchange
- Part 5: Risk Preferences
- Chapter 15. Risk Preferences and Prospect Theory
- 1. Three (of Four) Features of Prospect Theory
- Utility Function for Prospect Theory
- Widget 15.1 The Shape of the Utility Curve
- Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent
- Widget 15.2 Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent
- 2. Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality
- Risk Aversion and the Risk Premium
- Risk Neutrality: Linear Utility and No Loss Aversion
- Sources of Risk Aversion
- 3. The Values of Key Parameters
- Loss Aversion
- Decreasing Sensitivity to Gain and Loss
- Widget 15.3: Compute Your for Gain and Loss
- Measuring Sensitivity to Stimulus
- Experiment: Risk Preferences and Cognitive Ability
- 4. Risk Preferences of Rats
- Chapter 16. Problems with Probability
- 1. Probability in Prospect Theory
- Prelec Probability...
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2022 |
---|---|
Fachbereich: | Volkswirtschaft |
Genre: | Importe, Wirtschaft |
Rubrik: | Recht & Wirtschaft |
Medium: | Taschenbuch |
Inhalt: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
ISBN-13: | 9780197515921 |
ISBN-10: | 0197515924 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Einband: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
Autor: | O'Sullivan, Arthur |
Hersteller: | Oxford University Press Inc |
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de |
Maße: | 232 x 188 x 22 mm |
Von/Mit: | Arthur O'Sullivan |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 16.08.2022 |
Gewicht: | 0,818 kg |
Über den Autor
Arthur O'Sullivan is Dr. Robert B. Pamplin Jr. Professor of Economics at Lewis & Clark College. He is the author of Urban Economics, Ninth Edition (2019), the best-selling urban economics text, and co-author, with Steven Sheffrin and Stephen Perez, of Economics: Principles, Applications, and Tools, Tenth Edition (2020).
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Part 1: Introduction
- Chapter 1. Introduction and Key Concepts of Microeconomics
- 1. What is Behavioral Economics?
- 2. Key Concepts of Microeconomics
- Opportunity Cost
- The Marginal Principle
- The Equimarginal Principle
- Nash Equilibrium
- Comparative Statics
- Pareto Efficiency
- Lotteries and Certainty Equivalent
- Chapter 2. Insights from Behavioral Science
- 1. Social Preferences and Norms
- Adam Smith and the Impartial Spectator
- Rule Following Task: Avatar Pedestrian
- Sharing the Rewards of Collaboration
- Incurring a Cost to Enforce a Social Norm
- The 50-50 Norm
- 2. Mental Shortcuts
- Mental Accounting
- Default Options
- 3. Cognitive Bias
- The Decoy Effect
- Present Bias
- 4. Problems with Probabilities
- Rare Events
- Gambler's Fallacy
- 5. Instincts and Deliberation
- Apple versus Cupcake
- Hunting Practices of the Ju/'hoansi
- Why Do We Do That?
- Appendix to Chapter 2
- 1. Anchors
- 2. Confirmation Bias
- 3. Overconfidence Effect
- 4. Availability Heuristic
- Part 2: Social Preferences
- Chapter 3. Social Norms: Sharing and Enforcement
- 1. Utility Maximization with a Social Norm
- 2. Sharing Behavior: The Dictator Game
- Game Structure and Results
- Variation in Sharing Behavior
- 3. Norm Enforcement: Ultimatum Game
- Game Structure
- Norm-Sensitive Responder
- Equilibrium Responder Share
- Norm-Sensitive Proposer
- 4. Results from Ultimatum-Game Experiments
- Meta Analysis of Ultimatum Experiments
- Crosswalk Rules and the Ultimatum Game
- Competition Between Responders
- Widget 3.1: Equilibrium in the Ultimatum Game
- Chapter 4. Trust
- 1. The Trust Game: Investment and Production
- Game Structure
- Outcome in the Absence of a Sharing Norm
- 2. Sharing Norm for the Producer
- Producer's Tradeoff
- Varying Norm Sensitivity and Return Fractions
- Investor Decision
- 3. Sharing Norm for the Investor
- Investor's Tradeoff
- Relative Norm Sensitivity and Equilibrium
- Social Norms, Efficiency, and Social Capital
- 4. Experiments and Implications
- Experimental Results
- Trust Game and Social Capital
- Trust Game and Oxytocin
- Chapter 5. Public Goods
- 1. Free Riding and Experiments
- The Free-Rider Problem
- Results from Voluntary-Contribution Experiments
- 2. Social Norms and Voluntary Contributions
- Norm: Efficient Choice
- Norm: Equal Contribution
- Explaining a Path of Decreasing Contributions
- 3. Punish Free Riders?
- Punishing Norm Violators
- Summary of Experimental Results
- Chapter 6. Reciprocity in the Workplace
- 1. Worker Reciprocity and Social Capital
- Perfect or Imperfect Information in the Workplace?
- Social Norms and Pareto Improvements
- 2. Worker Identity and Effort
- Utility-Maximizing Effort
- Insiders versus Outsiders
- Norm Sensitivity and Effort
- Producer Investment in Identity Management
- 3. Response to a Higher Wage
- Wages and a Sharing Norm
- Wages and the Work-Effort Norm
- Wages and Profit
- 4. Evidence of Worker Reciprocity
- Field Experiments
- A Gift-Exchange Experiment
- Chapter 7. Voluntary Prices
- 1. Voluntary Prices: Pay What You Want
- The Equal-Sharing Price and Norm-Violation Cost
- Variation in Norm Sensitivity
- Sustainability of PWW Systems
- Economic Experiment: Pay What You Want versus Pay it Forward
- Widget 7.1 PWW Price and Social Norms
- 2. Public Broadcasting: Free Riders and Punishing Pledge Drives
- Payoffs to Members and Free Riders
- Choosing the Length of a Pledge Drive
- Chapter 8. Imitation and Cultural Learning
- 1. Imitation and Conformity
- Over-Imitation by Humans
- Over-Imitation: Humans versus Chimpanzees
- Conformity and Matching Pennies
- 2. Faithful Imitation and Cultural Learning
- Manioc and Obscure Production Processes
- Social Learning: Humans versus Chimpanzees
- Part 3: Time Preferences
- Chapter 9. Discounting and Present Bias
- 1. Conventional Discounting and Present Bias
- The Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount Function
- Widget 9.1 Conventional Discounting and Present Bias
- Present Bias and Doubling Your Apples
- Time Inconsistency
- Time Inconsistency and the Relative Values of Bundles
- Present Bias and Regret
- 2. Estimates of Discounting Parameters
- Estimates of Conventional Discounting and Present Bias
- Economic Experiment: Patience Among Mothers and Children
- Widget 9.2 Roll Your Own Current Value
- 3. Illustrations: Cupcake, Weed, Bucket List
- Cupcake versus Apple
- Homeowner versus Weed
- The Bucket List
- Chapter 10. Time Preferences and Saving
- 1. Discounting and Intertemporal Choice
- Saving and the Equimarginal Principle
- Widget 10.1 Discounting, Present Bias, and Saving
- Present Bias and Regret
- 2. Saving Mandates and Nudges
- Response to Mandate: Active Saver
- Response to Mandate: Non-Saver
- Nudges: Defaults, Save More Tomorrow, and Saving Lotteries
- 3. Clueless versus Savvy Consumers
- Three-Period Model of Intertemporal Choice
- Consumption Path of the Clueless (Naive)
- Widget 10.2: Three-Period Consumption Program
- Regret of the Clueless
- Consumption Path of a Savvy Consumer
- Commitment Devices and Saving
- 4. Present Bias and Pre-Commitment by Pigeons
- Chapter 11. When to Act
- 1. Procrastination: Waiting Too Long
- Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker
- Conditions for Procrastination
- Widget 11.1 Present Bias and Procrastination
- Self Awareness and Procrastination
- Clueless versus Self-Aware: How to Tell the Difference
- 2. Preproperation: Acting Too Soon
- Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker
- Conditions for Preproperation
- Self Awareness and Preproperation
- Chapter 12. Application of Present Bias--Sin Taxes and Fertilizer
- 1. Personally Harmful Products and Sin Taxes
- A Model of a Personally Harmful Good
- Present Bias and a Personally Harmful Good
- Price and Consumer Choice
- Savvy Consumers and Hobbling
- Support for Sin Taxes
- Widget 12.1 Present Bias and a Sin Tax
- 2. Present Bias and Fertilizer Investment
- Review of Intertemporal Choice Model
- Present Bias and the Fertilizer Investment
- Policy Options
- Part 4: Mental Accounting and the Endowment Effect
- Chapter 13. Mental Accounting for Consumers
- 1. Mental Accounting and Fungibility
- Consumer Budgets and Fungibility
- Mental Accounting and Coupons
- 2. Other Implications of Mental Accounting
- Mental Accounting and Sunk Cost
- Decoupling Cost and Benefit: Credit Cards and Ride-Hailing Services
- Regular versus Premium Gasoline
- Chapter 14. Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect
- 1. Painful Loss and Loss Aversion
- Conventional Benefits and Costs of Exchange
- The Pain of Loss Exceeds the Joy of Gain
- Loss Aversion Parameter
- Loss Aversion and Reappraisal
- 2. The Endowment Effect
- Classic Endowment Experiment
- Evidence for the Endowment Effect
- Endowment Effect for Chimpanzees and Capuchin Monkeys
- The Endowment Effect and Asset Exchange
- Part 5: Risk Preferences
- Chapter 15. Risk Preferences and Prospect Theory
- 1. Three (of Four) Features of Prospect Theory
- Utility Function for Prospect Theory
- Widget 15.1 The Shape of the Utility Curve
- Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent
- Widget 15.2 Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent
- 2. Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality
- Risk Aversion and the Risk Premium
- Risk Neutrality: Linear Utility and No Loss Aversion
- Sources of Risk Aversion
- 3. The Values of Key Parameters
- Loss Aversion
- Decreasing Sensitivity to Gain and Loss
- Widget 15.3: Compute Your for Gain and Loss
- Measuring Sensitivity to Stimulus
- Experiment: Risk Preferences and Cognitive Ability
- 4. Risk Preferences of Rats
- Chapter 16. Problems with Probability
- 1. Probability in Prospect Theory
- Prelec Probability...
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2022 |
---|---|
Fachbereich: | Volkswirtschaft |
Genre: | Importe, Wirtschaft |
Rubrik: | Recht & Wirtschaft |
Medium: | Taschenbuch |
Inhalt: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
ISBN-13: | 9780197515921 |
ISBN-10: | 0197515924 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Einband: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
Autor: | O'Sullivan, Arthur |
Hersteller: | Oxford University Press Inc |
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de |
Maße: | 232 x 188 x 22 mm |
Von/Mit: | Arthur O'Sullivan |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 16.08.2022 |
Gewicht: | 0,818 kg |
Sicherheitshinweis