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Behavioral Economics
Taschenbuch von Arthur O'Sullivan
Sprache: Englisch

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Über den Autor
Arthur O'Sullivan is Dr. Robert B. Pamplin Jr. Professor of Economics at Lewis & Clark College. He is the author of Urban Economics, Ninth Edition (2019), the best-selling urban economics text, and co-author, with Steven Sheffrin and Stephen Perez, of Economics: Principles, Applications, and Tools, Tenth Edition (2020).
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Part 1: Introduction

  • Chapter 1. Introduction and Key Concepts of Microeconomics

  • 1. What is Behavioral Economics?

  • 2. Key Concepts of Microeconomics

  • Opportunity Cost

  • The Marginal Principle

  • The Equimarginal Principle

  • Nash Equilibrium

  • Comparative Statics

  • Pareto Efficiency

  • Lotteries and Certainty Equivalent

  • Chapter 2. Insights from Behavioral Science

  • 1. Social Preferences and Norms

  • Adam Smith and the Impartial Spectator

  • Rule Following Task: Avatar Pedestrian

  • Sharing the Rewards of Collaboration

  • Incurring a Cost to Enforce a Social Norm

  • The 50-50 Norm

  • 2. Mental Shortcuts

  • Mental Accounting

  • Default Options

  • 3. Cognitive Bias

  • The Decoy Effect

  • Present Bias

  • 4. Problems with Probabilities

  • Rare Events

  • Gambler's Fallacy

  • 5. Instincts and Deliberation

  • Apple versus Cupcake

  • Hunting Practices of the Ju/'hoansi

  • Why Do We Do That?

  • Appendix to Chapter 2

  • 1. Anchors

  • 2. Confirmation Bias

  • 3. Overconfidence Effect

  • 4. Availability Heuristic

  • Part 2: Social Preferences

  • Chapter 3. Social Norms: Sharing and Enforcement

  • 1. Utility Maximization with a Social Norm

  • 2. Sharing Behavior: The Dictator Game

  • Game Structure and Results

  • Variation in Sharing Behavior

  • 3. Norm Enforcement: Ultimatum Game

  • Game Structure

  • Norm-Sensitive Responder

  • Equilibrium Responder Share

  • Norm-Sensitive Proposer

  • 4. Results from Ultimatum-Game Experiments

  • Meta Analysis of Ultimatum Experiments

  • Crosswalk Rules and the Ultimatum Game

  • Competition Between Responders

  • Widget 3.1: Equilibrium in the Ultimatum Game

  • Chapter 4. Trust

  • 1. The Trust Game: Investment and Production

  • Game Structure

  • Outcome in the Absence of a Sharing Norm

  • 2. Sharing Norm for the Producer

  • Producer's Tradeoff

  • Varying Norm Sensitivity and Return Fractions

  • Investor Decision

  • 3. Sharing Norm for the Investor

  • Investor's Tradeoff

  • Relative Norm Sensitivity and Equilibrium

  • Social Norms, Efficiency, and Social Capital

  • 4. Experiments and Implications

  • Experimental Results

  • Trust Game and Social Capital

  • Trust Game and Oxytocin

  • Chapter 5. Public Goods

  • 1. Free Riding and Experiments

  • The Free-Rider Problem

  • Results from Voluntary-Contribution Experiments

  • 2. Social Norms and Voluntary Contributions

  • Norm: Efficient Choice

  • Norm: Equal Contribution

  • Explaining a Path of Decreasing Contributions

  • 3. Punish Free Riders?

  • Punishing Norm Violators

  • Summary of Experimental Results

  • Chapter 6. Reciprocity in the Workplace

  • 1. Worker Reciprocity and Social Capital

  • Perfect or Imperfect Information in the Workplace?

  • Social Norms and Pareto Improvements

  • 2. Worker Identity and Effort

  • Utility-Maximizing Effort

  • Insiders versus Outsiders

  • Norm Sensitivity and Effort

  • Producer Investment in Identity Management

  • 3. Response to a Higher Wage

  • Wages and a Sharing Norm

  • Wages and the Work-Effort Norm

  • Wages and Profit

  • 4. Evidence of Worker Reciprocity

  • Field Experiments

  • A Gift-Exchange Experiment

  • Chapter 7. Voluntary Prices

  • 1. Voluntary Prices: Pay What You Want

  • The Equal-Sharing Price and Norm-Violation Cost

  • Variation in Norm Sensitivity

  • Sustainability of PWW Systems

  • Economic Experiment: Pay What You Want versus Pay it Forward

  • Widget 7.1 PWW Price and Social Norms

  • 2. Public Broadcasting: Free Riders and Punishing Pledge Drives

  • Payoffs to Members and Free Riders

  • Choosing the Length of a Pledge Drive

  • Chapter 8. Imitation and Cultural Learning

  • 1. Imitation and Conformity

  • Over-Imitation by Humans

  • Over-Imitation: Humans versus Chimpanzees

  • Conformity and Matching Pennies

  • 2. Faithful Imitation and Cultural Learning

  • Manioc and Obscure Production Processes

  • Social Learning: Humans versus Chimpanzees

  • Part 3: Time Preferences

  • Chapter 9. Discounting and Present Bias

  • 1. Conventional Discounting and Present Bias

  • The Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount Function

  • Widget 9.1 Conventional Discounting and Present Bias

  • Present Bias and Doubling Your Apples

  • Time Inconsistency

  • Time Inconsistency and the Relative Values of Bundles

  • Present Bias and Regret

  • 2. Estimates of Discounting Parameters

  • Estimates of Conventional Discounting and Present Bias

  • Economic Experiment: Patience Among Mothers and Children

  • Widget 9.2 Roll Your Own Current Value

  • 3. Illustrations: Cupcake, Weed, Bucket List

  • Cupcake versus Apple

  • Homeowner versus Weed

  • The Bucket List

  • Chapter 10. Time Preferences and Saving

  • 1. Discounting and Intertemporal Choice

  • Saving and the Equimarginal Principle

  • Widget 10.1 Discounting, Present Bias, and Saving

  • Present Bias and Regret

  • 2. Saving Mandates and Nudges

  • Response to Mandate: Active Saver

  • Response to Mandate: Non-Saver

  • Nudges: Defaults, Save More Tomorrow, and Saving Lotteries

  • 3. Clueless versus Savvy Consumers

  • Three-Period Model of Intertemporal Choice

  • Consumption Path of the Clueless (Naive)

  • Widget 10.2: Three-Period Consumption Program

  • Regret of the Clueless

  • Consumption Path of a Savvy Consumer

  • Commitment Devices and Saving

  • 4. Present Bias and Pre-Commitment by Pigeons

  • Chapter 11. When to Act

  • 1. Procrastination: Waiting Too Long

  • Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker

  • Conditions for Procrastination

  • Widget 11.1 Present Bias and Procrastination

  • Self Awareness and Procrastination

  • Clueless versus Self-Aware: How to Tell the Difference

  • 2. Preproperation: Acting Too Soon

  • Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker

  • Conditions for Preproperation

  • Self Awareness and Preproperation

  • Chapter 12. Application of Present Bias--Sin Taxes and Fertilizer

  • 1. Personally Harmful Products and Sin Taxes

  • A Model of a Personally Harmful Good

  • Present Bias and a Personally Harmful Good

  • Price and Consumer Choice

  • Savvy Consumers and Hobbling

  • Support for Sin Taxes

  • Widget 12.1 Present Bias and a Sin Tax

  • 2. Present Bias and Fertilizer Investment

  • Review of Intertemporal Choice Model

  • Present Bias and the Fertilizer Investment

  • Policy Options

  • Part 4: Mental Accounting and the Endowment Effect

  • Chapter 13. Mental Accounting for Consumers

  • 1. Mental Accounting and Fungibility

  • Consumer Budgets and Fungibility

  • Mental Accounting and Coupons

  • 2. Other Implications of Mental Accounting

  • Mental Accounting and Sunk Cost

  • Decoupling Cost and Benefit: Credit Cards and Ride-Hailing Services

  • Regular versus Premium Gasoline

  • Chapter 14. Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect

  • 1. Painful Loss and Loss Aversion

  • Conventional Benefits and Costs of Exchange

  • The Pain of Loss Exceeds the Joy of Gain

  • Loss Aversion Parameter

  • Loss Aversion and Reappraisal

  • 2. The Endowment Effect

  • Classic Endowment Experiment

  • Evidence for the Endowment Effect

  • Endowment Effect for Chimpanzees and Capuchin Monkeys

  • The Endowment Effect and Asset Exchange

  • Part 5: Risk Preferences

  • Chapter 15. Risk Preferences and Prospect Theory

  • 1. Three (of Four) Features of Prospect Theory

  • Utility Function for Prospect Theory

  • Widget 15.1 The Shape of the Utility Curve

  • Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent

  • Widget 15.2 Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent

  • 2. Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality

  • Risk Aversion and the Risk Premium

  • Risk Neutrality: Linear Utility and No Loss Aversion

  • Sources of Risk Aversion

  • 3. The Values of Key Parameters

  • Loss Aversion

  • Decreasing Sensitivity to Gain and Loss

  • Widget 15.3: Compute Your for Gain and Loss

  • Measuring Sensitivity to Stimulus

  • Experiment: Risk Preferences and Cognitive Ability

  • 4. Risk Preferences of Rats

  • Chapter 16. Problems with Probability

  • 1. Probability in Prospect Theory

  • Prelec Probability...
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2022
Fachbereich: Volkswirtschaft
Genre: Importe, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780197515921
ISBN-10: 0197515924
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: O'Sullivan, Arthur
Hersteller: Oxford University Press Inc
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 232 x 188 x 22 mm
Von/Mit: Arthur O'Sullivan
Erscheinungsdatum: 16.08.2022
Gewicht: 0,818 kg
Artikel-ID: 121356416
Über den Autor
Arthur O'Sullivan is Dr. Robert B. Pamplin Jr. Professor of Economics at Lewis & Clark College. He is the author of Urban Economics, Ninth Edition (2019), the best-selling urban economics text, and co-author, with Steven Sheffrin and Stephen Perez, of Economics: Principles, Applications, and Tools, Tenth Edition (2020).
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Part 1: Introduction

  • Chapter 1. Introduction and Key Concepts of Microeconomics

  • 1. What is Behavioral Economics?

  • 2. Key Concepts of Microeconomics

  • Opportunity Cost

  • The Marginal Principle

  • The Equimarginal Principle

  • Nash Equilibrium

  • Comparative Statics

  • Pareto Efficiency

  • Lotteries and Certainty Equivalent

  • Chapter 2. Insights from Behavioral Science

  • 1. Social Preferences and Norms

  • Adam Smith and the Impartial Spectator

  • Rule Following Task: Avatar Pedestrian

  • Sharing the Rewards of Collaboration

  • Incurring a Cost to Enforce a Social Norm

  • The 50-50 Norm

  • 2. Mental Shortcuts

  • Mental Accounting

  • Default Options

  • 3. Cognitive Bias

  • The Decoy Effect

  • Present Bias

  • 4. Problems with Probabilities

  • Rare Events

  • Gambler's Fallacy

  • 5. Instincts and Deliberation

  • Apple versus Cupcake

  • Hunting Practices of the Ju/'hoansi

  • Why Do We Do That?

  • Appendix to Chapter 2

  • 1. Anchors

  • 2. Confirmation Bias

  • 3. Overconfidence Effect

  • 4. Availability Heuristic

  • Part 2: Social Preferences

  • Chapter 3. Social Norms: Sharing and Enforcement

  • 1. Utility Maximization with a Social Norm

  • 2. Sharing Behavior: The Dictator Game

  • Game Structure and Results

  • Variation in Sharing Behavior

  • 3. Norm Enforcement: Ultimatum Game

  • Game Structure

  • Norm-Sensitive Responder

  • Equilibrium Responder Share

  • Norm-Sensitive Proposer

  • 4. Results from Ultimatum-Game Experiments

  • Meta Analysis of Ultimatum Experiments

  • Crosswalk Rules and the Ultimatum Game

  • Competition Between Responders

  • Widget 3.1: Equilibrium in the Ultimatum Game

  • Chapter 4. Trust

  • 1. The Trust Game: Investment and Production

  • Game Structure

  • Outcome in the Absence of a Sharing Norm

  • 2. Sharing Norm for the Producer

  • Producer's Tradeoff

  • Varying Norm Sensitivity and Return Fractions

  • Investor Decision

  • 3. Sharing Norm for the Investor

  • Investor's Tradeoff

  • Relative Norm Sensitivity and Equilibrium

  • Social Norms, Efficiency, and Social Capital

  • 4. Experiments and Implications

  • Experimental Results

  • Trust Game and Social Capital

  • Trust Game and Oxytocin

  • Chapter 5. Public Goods

  • 1. Free Riding and Experiments

  • The Free-Rider Problem

  • Results from Voluntary-Contribution Experiments

  • 2. Social Norms and Voluntary Contributions

  • Norm: Efficient Choice

  • Norm: Equal Contribution

  • Explaining a Path of Decreasing Contributions

  • 3. Punish Free Riders?

  • Punishing Norm Violators

  • Summary of Experimental Results

  • Chapter 6. Reciprocity in the Workplace

  • 1. Worker Reciprocity and Social Capital

  • Perfect or Imperfect Information in the Workplace?

  • Social Norms and Pareto Improvements

  • 2. Worker Identity and Effort

  • Utility-Maximizing Effort

  • Insiders versus Outsiders

  • Norm Sensitivity and Effort

  • Producer Investment in Identity Management

  • 3. Response to a Higher Wage

  • Wages and a Sharing Norm

  • Wages and the Work-Effort Norm

  • Wages and Profit

  • 4. Evidence of Worker Reciprocity

  • Field Experiments

  • A Gift-Exchange Experiment

  • Chapter 7. Voluntary Prices

  • 1. Voluntary Prices: Pay What You Want

  • The Equal-Sharing Price and Norm-Violation Cost

  • Variation in Norm Sensitivity

  • Sustainability of PWW Systems

  • Economic Experiment: Pay What You Want versus Pay it Forward

  • Widget 7.1 PWW Price and Social Norms

  • 2. Public Broadcasting: Free Riders and Punishing Pledge Drives

  • Payoffs to Members and Free Riders

  • Choosing the Length of a Pledge Drive

  • Chapter 8. Imitation and Cultural Learning

  • 1. Imitation and Conformity

  • Over-Imitation by Humans

  • Over-Imitation: Humans versus Chimpanzees

  • Conformity and Matching Pennies

  • 2. Faithful Imitation and Cultural Learning

  • Manioc and Obscure Production Processes

  • Social Learning: Humans versus Chimpanzees

  • Part 3: Time Preferences

  • Chapter 9. Discounting and Present Bias

  • 1. Conventional Discounting and Present Bias

  • The Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount Function

  • Widget 9.1 Conventional Discounting and Present Bias

  • Present Bias and Doubling Your Apples

  • Time Inconsistency

  • Time Inconsistency and the Relative Values of Bundles

  • Present Bias and Regret

  • 2. Estimates of Discounting Parameters

  • Estimates of Conventional Discounting and Present Bias

  • Economic Experiment: Patience Among Mothers and Children

  • Widget 9.2 Roll Your Own Current Value

  • 3. Illustrations: Cupcake, Weed, Bucket List

  • Cupcake versus Apple

  • Homeowner versus Weed

  • The Bucket List

  • Chapter 10. Time Preferences and Saving

  • 1. Discounting and Intertemporal Choice

  • Saving and the Equimarginal Principle

  • Widget 10.1 Discounting, Present Bias, and Saving

  • Present Bias and Regret

  • 2. Saving Mandates and Nudges

  • Response to Mandate: Active Saver

  • Response to Mandate: Non-Saver

  • Nudges: Defaults, Save More Tomorrow, and Saving Lotteries

  • 3. Clueless versus Savvy Consumers

  • Three-Period Model of Intertemporal Choice

  • Consumption Path of the Clueless (Naive)

  • Widget 10.2: Three-Period Consumption Program

  • Regret of the Clueless

  • Consumption Path of a Savvy Consumer

  • Commitment Devices and Saving

  • 4. Present Bias and Pre-Commitment by Pigeons

  • Chapter 11. When to Act

  • 1. Procrastination: Waiting Too Long

  • Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker

  • Conditions for Procrastination

  • Widget 11.1 Present Bias and Procrastination

  • Self Awareness and Procrastination

  • Clueless versus Self-Aware: How to Tell the Difference

  • 2. Preproperation: Acting Too Soon

  • Present Bias and a Clueless Decision Maker

  • Conditions for Preproperation

  • Self Awareness and Preproperation

  • Chapter 12. Application of Present Bias--Sin Taxes and Fertilizer

  • 1. Personally Harmful Products and Sin Taxes

  • A Model of a Personally Harmful Good

  • Present Bias and a Personally Harmful Good

  • Price and Consumer Choice

  • Savvy Consumers and Hobbling

  • Support for Sin Taxes

  • Widget 12.1 Present Bias and a Sin Tax

  • 2. Present Bias and Fertilizer Investment

  • Review of Intertemporal Choice Model

  • Present Bias and the Fertilizer Investment

  • Policy Options

  • Part 4: Mental Accounting and the Endowment Effect

  • Chapter 13. Mental Accounting for Consumers

  • 1. Mental Accounting and Fungibility

  • Consumer Budgets and Fungibility

  • Mental Accounting and Coupons

  • 2. Other Implications of Mental Accounting

  • Mental Accounting and Sunk Cost

  • Decoupling Cost and Benefit: Credit Cards and Ride-Hailing Services

  • Regular versus Premium Gasoline

  • Chapter 14. Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect

  • 1. Painful Loss and Loss Aversion

  • Conventional Benefits and Costs of Exchange

  • The Pain of Loss Exceeds the Joy of Gain

  • Loss Aversion Parameter

  • Loss Aversion and Reappraisal

  • 2. The Endowment Effect

  • Classic Endowment Experiment

  • Evidence for the Endowment Effect

  • Endowment Effect for Chimpanzees and Capuchin Monkeys

  • The Endowment Effect and Asset Exchange

  • Part 5: Risk Preferences

  • Chapter 15. Risk Preferences and Prospect Theory

  • 1. Three (of Four) Features of Prospect Theory

  • Utility Function for Prospect Theory

  • Widget 15.1 The Shape of the Utility Curve

  • Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent

  • Widget 15.2 Utility Value and Certainty Equivalent

  • 2. Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality

  • Risk Aversion and the Risk Premium

  • Risk Neutrality: Linear Utility and No Loss Aversion

  • Sources of Risk Aversion

  • 3. The Values of Key Parameters

  • Loss Aversion

  • Decreasing Sensitivity to Gain and Loss

  • Widget 15.3: Compute Your for Gain and Loss

  • Measuring Sensitivity to Stimulus

  • Experiment: Risk Preferences and Cognitive Ability

  • 4. Risk Preferences of Rats

  • Chapter 16. Problems with Probability

  • 1. Probability in Prospect Theory

  • Prelec Probability...
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2022
Fachbereich: Volkswirtschaft
Genre: Importe, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780197515921
ISBN-10: 0197515924
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: O'Sullivan, Arthur
Hersteller: Oxford University Press Inc
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 232 x 188 x 22 mm
Von/Mit: Arthur O'Sullivan
Erscheinungsdatum: 16.08.2022
Gewicht: 0,818 kg
Artikel-ID: 121356416
Sicherheitshinweis